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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(c), confer jurisdiction upon this court to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No, 1: Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance, relative to the purchase 
of Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property. 
Issue No. 2: It was judicial error, and/or an abuse of the discretion, for the trial court to not 
allow Petitioner/Appellant to deduct the same costs as if the properties had been sold to bona fide 
third party purchasers. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The issues attendant to the parties' divorce were tried by the Honorable Thomas L. 
Kay, Second Judicial District Court Judge on October 1 and 2, 2002. Petitioner/Appellant's then 
counsel prepared proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Respondent/Appellee filed 
an objection to the proposed documents. Subsequent to the objection, on or about November 15, 
2002, Respondent/Appellee filed a " Withdrawal of Objection to Form of Findings and Decree" in 
which it was represented to the trial court that 
...counsel for the parties have resolved the issues concerning the form of the 
documents and counsel for Respondent has approved as to form the acceptable 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce. Respondent 
prays that the documents which have been approved as to form be signed and entered 
by the Court as soon as received. 
See, Withdrawal of Objection, page 138 of the Second District Court file provided as the Record on 
Appeal to this Court. 
2. On or about November 25, 2005, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce were signed by the Honorable Thomas L, Kay, Second Judicial District Court 
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Judge and entered by the Second Judicial District Court Clerk. Within the Decree of Divorce, the 
Petitioner/Appellant was 
awarded a right of first refusal for the purchase of any and all of the California 
properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California property, 
the petitioner shall receive written notice of the acceptance of the offer and shall have 
thirty (30) days from the receipt of said notice to provide written noticeof his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. If petitioner 
exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay respondent the amount she would 
receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 30 days of the 
time he exercise his right of first refusal. 
See, Decree of Divorce, page 4, paragraph 15, page 170 of the Second District Court file provided 
as the Record on Appeal to this Court. 
3. Petitioner/Appellant was also ordered to pay Respondent/Appellee alimony in the sum 
of $1,000.00 per month. 
until terminated by the Court or upon the remarriage or cohabitation of the 
respondent, the death of either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, 
under Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
See, Decree of Divorce, page 6, paragraph 23, page 172 of the Second District Court file provided 
as the Record on Appeal to this Court. 
4. The parties owned several parcels of real property, which were found to be joint 
marital property and the Decree of Divorce ordered to be sold, subject to Petitioner/Appellant's right 
of first refusal. Of those properties, only two are the subject of this Appeal and are described as 
follows: 
a. land and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California, herein after referred to as the "Personal Residence; and" 
b. land and associated improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California, herein after referred to as the "Lake Property." 
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5. In June 2003, Petitioner/Appellant discovered, through a court pleading filed by 
Respondent/Appellee, that Respondent/Appellee had received and accepted a bona fide "Purchase 
Agreement" offer from a third party. Respondent/Appellee failed to provide Petitioner/Appellant 
notice that Respondent/Appellee had accepted a bona fide offer as required by the Decree of Divorce 
entered in this matter. See, Decree of Divorce, page 4, paragraph 15, Page 170 of the Record on 
Appeal as provided by the Second Judicial District Court. 
6. Petitioner/Appellant provided a written offer to Respondent/Appellee (Trial 
Transcript, page 27, lines 21-23) which included his offer to purchase Respondent/Appellee's interest 
in the property for $39,286.74 and tendered payment in that amount. This amount was designated 
by Petitioner/Appellant as a "good faith" estimate of the actual amount Respondent/Appellee would 
receive from the sale of the property pursuant to the terms "Purchase Agreement" offer 
Respondent/Appellee had received and accepted. Petitioner/Appellant included a copy of his 
calculations in the form of an "Estimated Settlement Statement,"as part of the written offer and tender 
of payment. Petitioner/Appellant also provided Respondent/Appellee with a quit claim deed for the 
subject property. Petitioner/Appellant's offer was not, and could not have been, an exercise of his 
"right of first refusal," as Respondent/Appellee had failed and refused to notify Petitioner/Appellant 
of her acceptance of a bona fide offer. 
7. Petitioner/Appellant's tender of payment was his offer to purchase the property, with 
the sole condition being transfer of the title to the property upon negotiation of the funds tendered 
for payment of the real property. Petitioner/Appellant's offer to purchase the real property was not 
subject to the same terms as the offer Respondent/Appellee had received from a third party. 
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8. Respondent/Appellee negotiated that $39,286.74 payment (Trial Transcript, page 102, 
lines 6 and 7), which consisted of two money orders and a cashier's check. However, 
Respondent/Appellee did not return the "quit claim deed" that was to be signed, notarized and 
returned to Petitioner/Appellant upon receipt of tender of the purchase price offered by 
Petitioner/Appellant. Instead, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner/Appellant that, despite 
receiving the "sales agreement" from Petitioner/Appellant and negotiating the payments, those monies 
were insufficient for her to return the signed and notarized quit claim deed for the Personal 
Residence. 
9. Upon receipt of Respondent/Appellee's notice of alleged insufficiency in the monies 
she received, Petitioner/Appellant immediately notified Respondent/Appellee that he would not agree 
to any additional conditions on the "sale" of the Personal Residence. Petitioner/Appellant also 
requested that Respondent/Appellee immediately return the $39,286.74 he had paid 
Respondent/ Appellee for the sole purpose of payment of the "sales" price for the Personal Residence. 
10. Respondent/Appellee refused to refund those monies or abide by the terms of the sale 
proposed by Petitioner/Appellant. Instead, Respondent/Appellee prepared a completely new quit 
claim deed, using what appeared to be an Oklahoma quit claim deed form, which she had signed and 
notarized. (Trial Transcript, page 32, lines 15-17.) Petitioner/Appellant filed the "quit claim deed" 
in the County of Yuma, State of California and ownership of the Personal Residence was transferred 
to Petitioner/Appellant. 
11. Also, in June 2003. Petitioner/Appellant discovered, through Respondent/Appellee's 
Agent, that Respondent/Appellee had received, and intended to accept, a bona fide "Purchase 
Agreement" offer from a third party for the "Lake Property." 
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12. Petitioner/Appellant mailed Respondent/Appellee a $15,044.26 payment, which was 
specifically designated as the first portion of Respondent/Appellee's one-half share of the estimated 
net sales proceeds of the Lake Property. Petitioner/Appellant also informed Respondent/Appellee 
that the balance would be paid within thirty (30) days, as set forth in paragraph 15 of the Decree of 
Divorce. Petitioner/Appellant did calculate the net proceeds that should be paid to 
Respondent/Appellee on the same terms as the bona fide "Purchase Agreement" offer 
Respondent/Appellee had received from a third party. 
13. Once again, being fully informed of the purpose of those funds, Respondent/Appellee 
deposited those funds into her bank or otherwise negotiated the payment. Again, 
Respondent/Appellee failed and refused to return the quit claim deed for the "Lake Property." 
Instead, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner that she had not accepted the bona fide "Purchase 
Agreement" offer from the third party. Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner/Appellant that she 
would neither return the monies Petitioner/Appellant had paid for the sole purpose of purchasing the 
Lake Property. Instead, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner that those monies would first be 
used to pay the additional $1,500.00 Respondent/Appellee believed was still owed to her for her 
interest in the Personal Residence. In addition, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner/Appellant 
that she was keeping $6,000.00 of those monies to pay future alimony payments. 
Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner that remaining $7,500.00 would either be returned to 
Petitioner/Appellant or that Respondent/Appellee would apply that only the remaining $7,500.00 the 
amount Respondent/Appellee believed would be owed to her if Petitioner/Appellant chose to 
"purchase" the Lake Property. (Trial Transcript, page 49, lines 13 -25, and page 50, lines 1 -18.) 
Respondent/Appellee refiised to allow Petitioner/Appellant to purchase the Lake Property under the 
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same terms as the bona fide offer she had previously received and expected Petitioner/Appellant to 
pay a higher price for the Lake Property. 
14. Petitioner/Appellant rejected Respondent/Appellee's counteroffer for the Lake 
Property and, once again, demanded the return of the entire $15,044.26 he had tendered to 
Respondent/Appellee for the sole purpose of purchasing the Lake Property. Respondent/Appellee 
refused to return the monies to Petitioner/Appellant. 
15. There was no further communication between the parties regarding either of the real 
properties until Respondent/Appellee filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause in the Second 
District Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah in April of 2004. The trial court's decision 
after an evidentiary hearing on November 10, 2004, as set forth in the "Order After Hearing," signed 
and filed by the Court on November 25, 2004. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1. There is no dispute that Respondent/Appellee was provided a copy of 
Petitioner/Appellant's "sales" proposal for both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property. There 
is no dispute that Respondent/Appellee negotiated the payment she received, had the use and benefit 
of those monies to the detriment of Petitioner/Appellant and refused to return those monies when 
Petitioner/Appellant refused to accept her modified terms of "sale." There is no dispute that 
Respondent/Appellee did provide a signed and notarized quit claim deed for the Personal Residence 
rather than return the purchase price to Petitioner/Appellant. There is no dispute that 
Respondent/Appellee had the use and benefit of the payment for the Lake Property, to the detriment 
of Petitioner/Appellant and refused to return those monies when Petitioner/Appellant refused to 
accept her counteroffer for the Lake Property. The transactions between the parties, as to both 
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parcels of real property, meet the longstanding "offer, acceptance and tender" requirements of any 
contract transaction. Respondent/Appellee received the benefit of tender, to the detriment of 
Petitioner/Appellant and the court's equitable powers do not allow the trial court to modify a 
transaction simply because one of the parties has come to regret the agreement. Petitioner/ Appellant 
is entitled to specific performance as to both contracts for his purchase of Respondent/Appellee's 
interest in both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property. 
Issue No. 2. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce are 
clear as to which costs will be paid from the sales proceeds of the parties' California properties. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are clear that if Petitioner/Appellant 
exercised his right of first refusal to "purchase" the property, Petitioner/Appellant would pay 
Respondent/Appellee the amount she would receive from the sale of the parcel based on the same 
terms of the bona fide offer pay if the property were sold to a third party. There was no request 
before the trial court by either party to modify paragraphs 15 and 17 of the Decree of Divorce. The 
ruling by the trial court, that sales commissions or other estimated closing costs, could not be 
deducted from the monies to be paid to Respondent/Appellee was a judicial error and/or an abuse of 
judicial discretion. Petitioner/Appellant should be entitled to deduct the costs that would have been 
incurred if the properties were sold to a bona fide third party purchaser prior to paying 
Respondent/Appellee her one-half interest in the subject real properties. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue No, 1: Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance relative to the purchase 
of Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property. 
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1. The Utah Supreme Court, in Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), found that 
there is 
no principle of equity that demands all the terms of the contract must be set forth in 
the written agreement. Rather, although an agreement is uncertain or incomplete in 
some respects, its specific enforcement may nevertheless be decreed where the 
uncertainty relates to matters which the law makes certain or complete by 
presumption, rule or custom and usage. Where there is no agreement concerning the 
terms of payment this Court will alleviate the uncertainty of this aspect of the contract 
by requiring full payment at the time of the tender of the conveyance. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of the rule that "to be 
enforceable a contract must be sufficiently definite in its terms that the parties know what is required 
of them." Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491; and Cf Ansorge v. Kane, 244 N. Y. 
395, 155 N.E 683. However, in Kierk v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 1139 (Utah 1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court quantified that position by finding that 
But like all rules, which are necessarily stated in generality, it is only applicable in the 
proper circumstances, where the justice of the case requires: as a shield to protect a 
party from an injustice, and not as a weapon with which to perpetrate an injustice. 
3. Under the evidence and the particular facts of this case, as well as in Kierk, there is 
no dispute that Petitioner/Appellant agreed to purchase Respondent/Appellee's interest in the 
Personal Residence for the price of the $39,286.74, Respondent/Appellee provide a quit claim to the 
property and Petitioner/Appellant should be entitled to specific performance as to the Personal 
Residence or the return of the $39,286.74 he paid to Respondent/Appellee for the sole purpose of 
purchasing her one-half interest in the Personal Residence. 
4. Kierk is also applicable as to specific performance of the purchase of 
Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in the Lake Property. Again, Petitioner/Appellant provided 
Respondent/Appellee a written offer, to include partial payment, with the remainder to be paid within 
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30 days Respondent/Appellee negotiated the payment and then presented a counteroffer to 
Petitioner. Again, the Utah Supreme Court found that if only the parties reserve only 
the "terms" of payment, they should be obliged to act in good faith in keeping their 
promises. It would seem inequitable and unjust to permit a seller to simply refuse 
unreasoningly to perform and seek specious excuses in an attempt to justify his 
refusal But neither party should be permitted to use the reservation of "terms" to 
get more than they had promised: the plaintiff to get more land, or the defendants to 
get more money, nor either to renege on the bargain... 
5. Respondent/Appellee's acceptance was "positive and unambiguous" as required by 
the Utah Supreme Court in RJ.Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194 (Utah 1952). 
Respondent/Appellee's actions in negotiating the payment, refusal to return the payment and signing 
the quit claim deed before a notary and then providing that quit claim deed did not change, add to, 
or qualify the terms of the offer by Petitioner/Appellant and the contract between the parties for the 
"sale" of the California properties is complete and "its binding force cannot be affected by subsequent 
communications unless they amount to a mutual agreement to rescind." IdL 
6. In this instant dispute, all of Petitioner/Appellant's terms were set forth in the written 
proposal that was sent to Respondent/Appellee and Petitioner/Appellant tendered his "full payment" 
and requested "tender of the conveyance." Respondent/ Appellee accepted those terms as evidenced 
by her negotiation of the tender representing Petitioner/Appellant's purchase price 
Petitioner/Appellant believes that copies of the relevant documents (i.e., purchase agreement, checks 
and quit claim deed) were entered into the record and are contained in the sealed exhibit envelope in 
the Second District Court filed designated as the Record on Appeal. Petitioner/Appellant was 
informed that sealed envelope cannot be opened absent a court order and Petitioner/Appellant is 
unable to provide copies of those documents at this time. 
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7. In this instant dispute, all of Petitioner/Appellant's terms were set forth in the written 
proposal that was sent to Respondent/Appellee and Petitioner/Appellant tendered his "full payment" 
and requested "tender of the conveyance." Respondent/Appellee had the use and benefit of that 
tender, to the detriment of Petitioner/Appellant. Respondent/Appellee cannot hold the quit claim 
deed hostage to obtain more money and Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance as 
to the transfer of interest in the Personal Residence. Respondent/Appellee cannot hold the quit claim 
deed hostage to obtain more money and Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance as 
to the transfer of Respondent/Appellee's interest in the Personal Residence. 
8. Similarly, Respondent/Appellee had the use and benefit, to the detriment of 
Petitioner/Appellant, of the monies paid by Petitioner/Appellant, purchase and transfer of 
Respondent/Appellee's interest in the Lake Property. Again, Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to 
specific performance as to the transfer of Respondent/Appellee's interest in the Lake Property. 
Issue No. 2. It was judicial error and/or an abuse of the discretion for the trial court not to 
allow Petitioner/Appellant to deduct the same costs as if the properties had been sold to bona fide 
third party purchasers. The Decree of Divorce is clear as to which costs of sale will be deducted from 
the sales proceeds prior to the 50/50 division of the net proceeds between the parties. 
It is not the province of the court to alter a contract by construction or to make a new 
contract for the parties; its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which they 
have made for themselves, without regard to its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot 
supply material stipulations or read into the contract words which it does not contain. 
Jensen v. Kidman, 85 Utah 27 (Utah 1934) 
In the interest of promoting stability in titles, modifications in a decree of divorce 
affecting the "disposition of real property are to be granted only upon a showing of 
compelling reasons arising from a substantial and material change in circumstances." 
Williams v. Shearwood, 688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984) (property divisions should 
be modified only with great reluctance and upon compelling reasons). 
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[E]quity should not be used as a lever to realign rights and privileges 'Voluntarily 
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain made." Lea v. 
Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) (quoting Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 
1250-51 (Utah 1980)). Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57 (1990) 
9. The trial court does maintain continuing jurisdiction over divorce matters and has the 
authority to modify a decree of divorce. However, Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that "... proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by filing a petition to 
modify the divorce decree." [emphasis added.] Petitioner/Appellant had filed a petition to modify as 
to the issue of alimony, but Respondent/Appellee did not file a counter-petition requesting 
modification of paragraphs 15 and 17 of the Decree of Divorce. Respondent/Appellee filed her 
Motion for Order to Show Cause, on March 31, 2004 and, at that time, Rule 106 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure included a provision that "No request to modify a decree shall be raised by an 
order to show cause," which was not deleted until April 1, 2004." 
10. If this Court finds that Petitioner/Appellant is not entitled to specific performance as 
to his purchase of Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in the subject real properties, 
Petitioner/Appellant must be allowed to deduct the costs of sale as set forth in the parties' Decree of 
Divorce. Respondent/Appellee has shown no substantial change of circumstances as to terms of sale 
set forth in the parties' Decree of Divorce. Respondent/Appellee is not entitled to additional monies 
simply because she now regrets the bargain she made. 
CONCLUSION 
It was judicial error and/or an abuse of judicial discretion for the trial court to refuse to order 
Respondent/Appellee to either return the monies Petitioner/Appellant paid to Respondent/Appellee 
for the subject real properties or order Respondent/Appellee to transfer her interest in the subject 
properties to Petitioner/Appellant. In the alternative, the trial court should have enforced the terms 
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of sale as set forth in the parties' Decree of Divorce and allowed Petitioner/Appellant to pay 
Respondent/ Appellee only the amount she would have received if the real properties had been sold 
to a bona fide third party purchaser. The ruling of trial court should be reversed and 
Respondent/Appellee should be ordered to either return all monies she was paid for the real property 
to Petitioner/Appellant or provide the quit claim deeds to the properties absent any additional 
conditions. 
DATED this Z~Z_ day of m q v ^ x 2006. 
TERRY R. SPENCER 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of March, 2006,1 caused two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid to: 
JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211 
Patterson, Barking & Larkin 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2006. 
n,h 
Terry R. Spence 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211 of 
PATTERSON, BARKING, THOMPSON & LARKIN 
Attorney for Respondent 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-7704 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
Petitioner, 
vs, 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Respondent, 
WITHDRAWAL OF OBJECTION 
TO FORM OF FINDINGS AND DECREE 
Civil No. 004702059DA 
Judge: Thomas L. Kay 
Commissioner: David L. Dillon 
COMES NOW Respondent, LINDA CARYL BAYLES, by and through 
her attorney of record, and withdraws her Objection to Form 
previously filed herein, on the basis that counsel for the parties 
have resolved the issues concerning the form of the documents 
and counsel for Respondent has approved as to form the 
acceptable Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree 
of Divorce. Respondent prays that the documents which have been 
approved as to form be signed and entered by the Court as soon as 
received. . 
Dated this IH day of //(L^^ 2002. 
/ithdrawai of Objection \ NG 
or Respondent 
' BAYLES, LINDA CAR c D 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / ^  day of November, 2002, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Withdrawal 
of Objection to Eric N. Weeks, Attorney for Petitioner, at 1050 
Walker Terrace, 19 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
postage prepaid. 
JUDY 
Attorn 
E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412) 
ERIC N. WEEKS (7340) 
WEEKS LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
1050 Walker Terrace 
19 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2800 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Civil No. 004702059 DA 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Respondent | 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a 
trial on this matter held on October 1 through October 2, 2002. 
The Court, having reviewed the documents and pleadings on file 
herein, having heard testimony and reviewed documentation and 
being fully advised as to both the evidence and law pertaining 
thereto, hereby makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The petitioner is a resident of Davis County, State of 
Utah, and has been for at least three (3) months immediately prior 
to the filing of this action. 
•INDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FILED 
NOV 2 5 2002 
Layton District Court 
n r w r r n o n s o VD10820261 _ _ _ n D 
2. The parties resided in the marital relationship in the 
State of Utah or the acts complained of by the petitioner were 
committed by the respondent in the State of Utah and therefore the 
above-captioned Court has jurisdiction over the respondent 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) (1953 as amended). 
3 . The petitioner and respondent were married in the City 
of Bountiful, State of Utah, on the 10th day of August, 1988, and 
separated on or about November 28, 2000. 
Grounds for Divorce 
4. During the course of this marriage, differences have 
arisen between the parties, which differences have now become 
irreconcilable, thereby making continuation of the marriage 
relationship impossible. 
5. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
Children of the Parties 
6. No Children have been born as issue of this marriage 
and none are expected. 
7. The respondent currently has physical custody of two 
minor children, the petitioner's grand nephew Andrew Vincent 
Salazar and Andrew's sister BreAnna Rosa Flores Salazar, who are 
not the issue of this marriage. Custody is held pursuant to. 
Salazar v. Salazar, case number 954904926 DA, filed in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
8. The Court finds that the issue of child support was 
not certified for trial and, even if it had been, there is no Utah 
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statute or case law that extends an obligation for petitioner to 
pay child support in this circumstance. 
Health Insurance 
9. Each party should maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner should 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
10. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the 
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March 
1, 2002. The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from 
said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the 
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by 
petitioner. He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party 
to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation. 
11. On August 30, 2 002, the Commissioner ruled that his 
Order was to be applied prospectively and not retroactively. He 
found the petitioner wrongfully withheld $1,312.50 representing 
one-half of the cost of health insurance premiums previously paid 
by petitioner for 15 months from the date of separation to the 
date of his Order (December 1, 2000, to February 14, 2002) and 
ordered the petitioner to reimburse the amount of $1,312.50 to the 
respondent. 
12. The petitioner has failed to reimburse to the 
respondent $1,312.50, representing petitioner's withholding of 1/2 
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of the cost of health insurance premiums paid from December 1, 
2000, through February 14, 2002 ($87.50 x 15 months = $1,312.50). 
Debts and Obligations 
13. The parties have incurred certain debts and 
obligations. The parties are unable to afford the lifestyle they 
have been maintaining and have incurred extensive credit card 
debt. 
14. The respondent should be required to pay and hold 
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the 
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
15. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold 
the respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First 
Credit Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit 
Union, and the Firestone account. 
16. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. This Court finds that the majority of the debt was 
incurred by the petitioner and that petitioner had the financial 
ability to pay the debt and the respondent did not. 
Real Property 
17. The petitioner and the respondent have acquired a 
residence located at 1422 Vineyard Drive, Bountiful, Utah (the 
''Bountiful Residence"). The Bountiful Residence should be awarded 
to the petitioner subject to the debt thereon. The respondent 
should cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the 
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petitioner or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest 
in the Bountiful Residence. 
18. The petitioner should be permitted to sell the 
Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim 
or interest therein. The petitioner should be permitted to retain 
any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale 
thereof. Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents 
and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed 
with the sale and transfer of the Residence. 
19. The respondent should not be responsible for 
payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful 
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the 
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in 
August 2 001. 
20. The parties have acquired additional interests in 
certain other real property, including but not limited to 
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; and 
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California, 
also known as the Beehive Mine. 
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21. Parcels 1, 13, 15, and 16 are found to be jointly 
held by the parties and should be considered joint marital 
property. 
22. The Court finds that there is not clear and 
convincing evidence of duress associated with plaintiff's transfer 
of parcels 8 and 10 to the respondent as a joint tenant. Parcels 
8 and 10 should be considered joint marital property. 
23. The real property and improvements known as Parcel 
2 (also known as parcels 22 and 23) located at approximately 10681 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California shall be considered joint 
marital property. There is not sufficient evidence to 
conclusively track the funds used to purchase the property and to 
establish the lack of commingling that would be required to 
establish Parcel 2 (also referred to as Parcels 22 and 23) as the 
separate property of the petitioner. 
24. In light of the parties' past payment and debt 
history, the above-mentioned California properties should be sold 
as soon as possible. 
25. The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to 
retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be 
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for 
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties. 
26. The petitioner should be awarded a right of first 
refusal for the purchase of any and all of the California 
properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a 
California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice 
of the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days 
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from the receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his 
election to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona 
fide offer. If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, 
he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from the 
sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 30 days of the 
time he exercises his right of first refusal. 
27. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (3 0) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
28. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
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October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
29. The Court finds that the real property and 
improvements located at (a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and (b) Blanding, Utah, are the separate, inherited property 
of the petitioner. 
30. The petitioner has made no claim in these 
proceedings as to any ownership interest in the home in which 
respondent is residing in the State of Oklahoma nor to the 
respondent's mother's home in Oklahoma. 
Personal Property 
31. The parties have acquired certain joint marital 
personal property, including household furniture, motor vehicles, 
and certain personal property and possessions. 
32. The respondent should be awarded those personal 
heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates, 
platters, clocks, and lamps. The court finds that the ski pole in 
the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the 
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole. 
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and 
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within 
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at 
the expense of the petitioner. 
33. The remainder of the personal property should be 
awarded to the parties as currently divided. 
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34. The petitioner has received approximately $15,000 
more in value of personal property than has the respondent. 
35. The Court finds that the petitioner has paid 
$15,000 to the respondent, which shall be considered an offset for 
the additional value of personal property received by the 
petitioner. 
Alimony 
36. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002, through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
37. The respondent has the ability to earn $8 per hour 
and to work 40 hours per week. The petitioner is not working like 
he used to work, but historically has had a greater ability to pay 
expenses than the respondent has ability to earn money. 
38. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
39. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
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the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of retirement and survivor benefits set forth 
in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
40. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
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during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
41. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
42. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
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reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 41 above. 
Life Insurance 
'43. The respondent should be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. The court finds that such 
designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of 
the parties. 
Attorney's Fees 
44. The Court finds three reasons for awarding attorney 
fees in this case. First, the respondent did not ask for the 
divorce and did not want the divorce so she had to hire an 
attorney. Secondly, the Court finds the respondent does not have 
the ability to pay. Thirdly, in light of the rulings previously, 
the respondent prevailed in more issues than the petitioner. 
45. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2 002, based upon petitioner's 
ability to pay a portion of the fees. The respondent should be 
ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. The petitioner should be ordered 
to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
46. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
to the other party any documents required to implement or support 
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
2. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
Children of the Parties 
3 . The petitioner shall not be obligated to pay child 
support to the respondent in regards to Andrew and BreAnna. 
Health Insurance 
4. Each party should maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner should 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
5. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the 
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March 
1, 2002. The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from 
said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the 
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by 
petitioner. He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party 
to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation. 
6. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the 
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the 
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to paragraph 6 above. The Court finds 
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that the check has already been delivered to the respondent as 
satisfaction of said obligation. 
Debts and Obligations 
7. The respondent should be required to pay and hold 
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the 
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
8. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold the 
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit 
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union, 
and the Firestone account. 
9. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. 
Real Property 
10. The Bountiful Residence should be awarded to the 
petitioner subject to the debt thereon. The respondent should 
cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner 
or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest in the 
Bountiful Residence. 
11. The petitioner should be permitted to sell the 
Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim 
or interest therein. The petitioner should be permitted to retain 
any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale 
thereof. Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents 
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and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed 
with the sale and transfer of the Residence. 
12. The respondent should not be responsible for 
payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful 
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the 
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in 
August 2001. 
13. The parties have acquired additional interests in 
certain other real property, including but not limited to 
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; 
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California, 
also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of land located 
in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 & 23. 
14. The above-mentioned California properties should be 
sold as soon as possible. 
15. The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to 
retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be 
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for 
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties. 
16. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal 
for the purchase of any and all of the California properties. 
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Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California 
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the 
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the 
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. 
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay 
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that 
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
17. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
18. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
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toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
19. The real property and improvements located at 
(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding, 
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner. 
Personal Property 
20. The respondent should be awarded those personal 
heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates, 
platters, clocks, and lamps. The court finds that the ski pole in 
the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the 
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole. 
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and 
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within 
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at 
the expense of the petitioner. 
21. The remainder of the personal property should be 
awarded to the parties as currently divided. 
22. The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall 
be considered an offset for the additional value of personal 
property received by the petitioner. 
Alimony 
23. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
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of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002 through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
24. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
25. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set 
forth in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
26. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
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and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
27. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
28. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 27, above. 
Life Insurance 
29. The respondent should be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. The court finds that such 
designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of 
the parties. 
Attorney's Fees 
30. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002. The respondent should be 
ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. The petitioner should be ordered 
18 
to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
31. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
to the other party any documents required to implement or support 
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
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IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
vs. 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004702059 DA 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a 
trial held on October 1 and October 2, 2002. The Court, having 
reviewed the documents and pleadings on file herein, having heard 
argument and testimony, and being fully advised as to both the 
evidence and law pertaining thereto, and having previously entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
2 . The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
* ' (VU/VUftDo 
Children of the Parties 
3. The petitioner is not obligated to pay child support 
to the respondent in regards to Andrew Vincent Salazar and BreAnna 
Rosa Flores Salazar. 
Health Insurance 
4. Each party shall maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner shall 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
5. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the 
insurance check in the amount of $1,63 6.03 in satisfaction of the 
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to the Commissioner's earlier 
recommendation. The check has already been delivered to the 
respondent as satisfaction of said obligation. 
Debts and Obligations 
6. The respondent is required to pay and hold petitioner 
harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the Citibank 
card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
7. The petitioner is required to pay and hold the 
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit 
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union, 
and the Firestone account. 
8. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
2 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. 
Real Property 
9. The Bountiful Residence is awarded to the petitioner 
subject to the debt thereon. The respondent shall execute a 
quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner or other documents 
necessary to relinquish her interest in the Bountiful Residence. 
10. The petitioner is permitted to sell the Bountiful 
Residence, with the respondent having no further claim or interest 
therein. The petitioner shall be permitted to retain any profit 
or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale thereof. 
Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents and taking 
any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed with the 
sale and transfer of the Residence. 
11. The respondent is not responsible for payment of 
the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful Residence for the 
period she resided in the Residence from the date of separation 
through the time she moved to Oklahoma in August 2001. 
12. The parties jointly hold certain other real 
property, namely (a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10692 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) 
Parcel 13 of land and associated improvements located at 10747 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, 
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California, also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of 
land located in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 
& 23. 
13. The above-mentioned California properties shall be 
sold as soon as possible. 
14. The petitioner is hereinafter entitled to retain 
the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and is obligated to 
maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for said parcels 
through the date of sale of said properties. 
15. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal 
for the purchase of any and all of the California properties. 
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California 
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the 
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days from the 
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. 
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay 
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that 
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
16. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
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right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 30 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
17. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
18. The real property and improvements located at 
(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding, 
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner. 
Personal Property 
19. The respondent is awarded those personal heirlooms 
located at the California properties, namely plates, platters, 
clocks, and lamps. The ski pole in the possession of the 
petitioner is a family heirloom of the respondent and respondent 
is awarded the ski pole. Petitioner is permitted to make a model 
of the ski pole and shall deliver possession of the ski pole to 
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the respondent within 90 days of entry of this Decree at her place 
of residence and at the expense of the petitioner. 
20. The remainder of the personal property is awarded 
to the parties as currently divided. 
21. The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall 
be considered an offset for the additional value of personal 
property received by the petitioner. 
Alimony 
22. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002 through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
23. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner is hereinafter obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
24. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
6 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set 
forth in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
25. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
26. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
27. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 26, above. 
7 
Life Insurance 
28. The respondent shall be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. 
Attorney's Fees 
29. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002. The respondent is ordered to 
assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and attorney's fees 
incurred herein. The petitioner is ordered to assume and pay his 
own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
30. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the 
other party any documents required to implement or support the 
provisions of this Decree. 
MADE AND ENTERED this of November, 2002. 
a 38-BaylesW.div d e c r e e 
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JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211 of 
PATTERSON, BARKING & LARKIN 
Attorney for Respondent 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-7704 
FILED 
° K 8 , 2004 
Layton District Court 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Respondent. 
ORDER AFTER HEARING 
Civil No. 004702059DA 
Judge: Thomas L. Kay 
Commissioner: David L. Dillon 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on November 
10, 2004, before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge, 
presiding, for evidentiary and objection hearing from Orders to 
Show Cause filed by both parties. Petitioner was present, and was 
represented by his counsel, Michael D. Murphy; Respondent was 
present, and was represented by her counsel, Judy Dawn Barking. 
The Court having heard the evidence of the parties, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1 • Beehive Mine property (APN 8, 10, Yuba County , 
California). Petitioner has indicated his intention to exercise 
his right of first refusal for this property. Therefore, he shall 
have thirty (30) days from the date of hearing to pay Respondent 
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her share of the purchase price for the property, which shall be 
$55,000,00 less Petitioner's actual incurred expenses, divided by 
two. 
2. Lake property (10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California). There is no current offer for the purchase of this 
property- There was no meeting of minds sufficient to establish a 
contract for sale at a price of $72,000 between the parties. The 
most recent offer by a third party to purchase the property for 
$85,000.00 has been withdrawn. The Court will not require 
Petitioner to purchase the property for that price when there is 
not an outstanding offer. The property should be placed back on 
the market; if Respondent accepts a new bona fide offer for sale of 
the property, Respondent or her counsel will notify Petitioner and 
his counsel in writing of the offer and Petitioner's thirty-day 
right of first refusal will begin to run at that time; if he 
exercises his right of first refusal, he will have thirty (30) days 
after exercising the right of first refusal to pay Petitioner her 
share of the sale price (which shall be the purchase price less 
expenses actually incurred by Petitioner, divided by two). If 
Petitioner fails to exercise his right of first refusal to purchase 
the property after receipt of such an offer, and fails to cooperate 
in closing the sale of the property, he may be held in contempt of 
the Court. 
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3. 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California(five 
acres). Based on the agreement of the parties, the property 
located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California, should 
be sold as soon as possible by closing on the offer which is 
currently outstanding, 
4. Unpaid Alimony. The Court will not find Petitioner 
in contempt at this time for his failure to pay alimony. A 
judgment has already been entered against him for unpaid alimony 
for the period from June 2003 through June 2004; the Court applies 
$13,000.00 of the funds (in the amount of $15,044.26) previously 
paid to Respondent to satisfy this judgment. 
5. Respondents claim for additional compensation for 
sale of 10695 Forbestown Road. Respondent was entitled to accept 
the funds tendered to her by Petitioner for purchase of this 
property, as she was entitled to at least this amount. In essence, 
by providing Respondent with a "Seller's Estimated Settlement 
Statement" (Exhibit 3) reflecting that he had expenses of 
$66,426.52, Petitioner failed to disclose that he had not actually 
incurred all the expenses listed in that document. That document 
is tantamount to an affirmative representation that Petitioner had, 
in fact, incurred all those expenses in the amounts shown therein. 
The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to deduct any 
expenses not actually incurred. In the case of this property, the 
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Court will not concern itself with the numerous small charges on 
the statement, but will award Respondent one-half of the real 
estate commissions which were not paid by Petitioner, in the amount 
of $4,350,00. The Court offsets against this amount the balance of 
$2,044.26 previously paid to Respondent by Petitioner, and awards 
Respondent the sum of $2,305.74 as remaining compensation for the 
sale of Respondent's interest in this property to Petitioner. 
6. Personal property. The Court will not find 
Respondent in contempt in connection with this issue. The Court 
finds that the lawn tractor was intended to be awarded to 
Petitioner, and awards him the sum of $2,700.00 for the lawn 
tractor, which is the value he claimed for the lawn tractor for 
purposes of dividing the personal property at the time of trial. 
This amount may be used to offset the amount awarded to Respondent 
in paragraph 5, above, leaving a balance of $394.2 6 owing to 
Petitioner from Respondent for the lawn tractor. 
7. Attorney' s fees and travel expenses. The Court 
reserves the issues of attorney's fees and travel expenses for 
future hearing. 
DATED this ^6L day of Qt& , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
^JAM^i' 
THOMAS L. KM 
DISTRICT COURT" JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH URCP 7(f) 
COMES NOW JUDY DAWN BARKING, and certifies to the above-
entitled Court, in accordance with 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that she did serve a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AFTER HEARING upon Wesley 0. Bayles, Petitioner, 
with the understanding that the Respondent herein is to have five 
(5) days to object to or to request amendments or changes in said 
ORDER AFTER HEARING, and that if the requests are not made within 
the five (5) day period, that the ORDER AFTER HEARING shall be 
submitted to the Court for its approval and signature. Said ORDER 
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was delivered to Michael D. Murphy, Attorney 
for Wesley 0. Bayles, Petitioner, by mailing a copy postage prepaid 
to his mailing address of P.O. Box 15, Kaysville, Utah 84037, this 
day of November, 2004. ^h 
JUDY MWN BAR! 
A t t o r n e y f o r Responden t 
